More specifically, a colleague mentioned the Lipstick Effect: the curious tendency for lipstick sales to rise in times of economic hardship. The effect was first observed in 2001 by Leonard Lauder, (of Estée Lauder), who noticed a surprising rise in lipstick sales following the 9/11 attacks. He later spotted the same pattern during the 2008 recession. His conclusion was that when people can’t afford big luxuries, they turn to small ones. A new handbag might be out of reach, but a $30 lipstick? Lauder assumed that women are looking to making the cage of economic hardship a little more gilded.

Lauder’s hypothesis - that women swap large indulgences for smaller, more affordable ones - made sense. However, a later study by professors Sarah Hill and Christopher Rodenheffer undermined this conclusion.

Hill and Rodenheffer expanded the study to include all beauty products, rather than exclusively lipsticks, which they discovered all became more sought after during recessions. In their experiment, the researchers presented women with purchasing choices under so-called “recession cues.” Even when budgets were tight, participants continued to prefer more expensive beauty products over cheaper ones. “Recession cues did not increase desire for discount-brand beauty products,” they wrote. Furthermore, rather than swapping out specifically ‘large indulgences’ as Lauder assumed, women decreased their spending on practical, non-beauty-enhancing products like furniture or technology.

Another motivation was needed to explain the effect.

Hill and Rodenheffer concluded that the draw toward luxury cosmetics had little to do with saving. They argued that in times of uncertainty, women were motivated to enhance their attractiveness, and that this led to the increase in sales. This was a strategy for survival.

Although finding a partner may be an aim of these women, there is also a less gendered, more practical interpretation: perhaps women aren’t seeking partners at all, but rather power and percieved confidence despite the recession. The so‑called beauty premium -a well-documented phenomenon in labour economics - shows that attractive individuals often earn more and have better career prospects than their peers.

Looking put-together can pay off, especially in competitive workplaces where confidence and presentation influence perception. Seen this way, the Lipstick Effect is less about vanity and indulgence and more about resilience.

Back at work, the conversation at lunch soon shifted to a related curiosity: the Hemline Index. Proposed in 1926 by economist George Taylor, it suggests that skirt lengths rise and fall with the stock market. Shorter hemlines equals stronger markets; longer skirts: tougher times.

And while it sounds like a fashion myth, there’s data to support it. Researchers at the Erasmus School of Economics found empirical evidence linking prosperity with shorter skirts and recessions with longer ones. Like lipstick sales, hemlines reflect a social mood of collective optimism or caution.

Neither the Lipstick Effect nor the Hemline Index will ever appear in official GDP forecasts. But they do remind us that economics isn’t just about numbers, but behaviour, sentiment, and storytelling. Industries like beauty and fashion translate those invisible shifts into visible trends.

Fashion’s global revenue was estimated between $1.7 trillion and $2.5 trillion in 2019, according to Euromonitor and McKinsey. It’s a mirror that helps to shape the economic reality as well as reflect it.

And so, if history is any guide, the next time lipstick sales soar, it might not just be about newfound shades of red.

(The global lipstick market, valued at about $17.5 billion in 2024, is projected to grow 4.8% annually through 2033, according to Market Data Forecast. Perhaps by 2027, we’ll know whether the next recession is written on our lips.)

To read more about the lipstick effect, I recommend the Forbes article: by Pamela N. Danziger.

To read more about the hemline index, see here

[‘Il n’y a rien de plus confortable que de ne pas penser’]

In the age of AI, the importance of critical (and human) thinking is appreciated more than ever as a valuable skill. Not thinking for ourselves is not a new phenomenon exclusive to AI and LLMs. Rather, I started to think about the issue after reading Douglas Murray’s 2019 book The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity. Murray details how a person’s thoughts can change based on the beliefs and words of a majority around them. In this essay, I reflect on the concept of ‘thinking for yourself’ in a general sense, which I consider particularly pertinent in this century. I turn to historic philosophers to support this (French, as I am writing from France), to reinforce this idea that critical thinking is a value that transcends time and context.

I will argue in this essay that thinking for yourself is deeply uncomfortable and that humans choose to not think for themselves as a form of protection. I will make three arguments to support this. Firstly, the argument that it is not unnatural for humans to think for themselves, but that we are sometimes taught not to question. Secondly, that willful ignorance is often used to avoid recognising truths that distress us, or do not serve us. Lastly, the argument that there is a material risk that comes with speaking out after thinking for oneself. While there are many, the main challenge of thinking for yourself is accepting the responsibility that comes with original ideas. Overall, I will argue that the challenges that come with thinking for themselves lead people actively to choose to not think critically, because nothing is more comfortable than not thinking.

An important distinction must first be made to define the term ‘not thinking’. ‘Not thinking’ can be either an active choice or involuntary (in that the individual does not have the means to think for themselves to the extent that this essay demands of humans). This involuntary inability to think for yourself could be due to factors such as age or cognitive disabilities. This essay will therefore only refer to the active ‘not thinking’ which is a choice, either conscious or subconscious.

Firstly, it is not unnatural for humans to think for themselves, rather, we are sometimes taught not to. This poses the challenge of having to unlearn this ideology in order to think for ourselves. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir argues that a woman is “taught… [to] renounce her autonomy” and is treated like a “living doll”. By repeating this verb “taught’, Beauvoir is implying not only that this passivity (not thinking for ourselves or taking action) is not innate, but that a woman is initially autonomous, capable of individual thoughts. Other groups also face the challenge of having to unlearn passivity in order to think for themselves: for example, the members of the sixteenth century French society that was observed by the Tupinambá representatives, as described by Montaigne. These observations include the fact that the King’s entourage did not question their subservient role to the child King. Following a similar line of argument, the second observation was that those living in poverty “put up with such injustice” and that they did not take matters into their own hands in equalizing the wealth distribution. In this, the Tubnambá pose the question: why are they not thinking for themselves? The fact that the Tubnambá can question these issues proves that this is not an innate belief. Yet the Europeans – even those whom the system impacted such as the poor – did not question it as they had been taught to simply accept the way that things were. Instead of unnatural, thinking for yourself is the natural thing for us to do, and it is this that defines us as humans. In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau’s claim that it is ‘freedom’ and ‘perfectibility’ that separate us from animals is a similar argument, particularly the latter, which refers to our ability to learn and create new and better ways of living. This is also supported by Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, in which he proposes that what he calls “good sense” – the ability to think for ourselves and make decisions – “is the only thing that makes us human and distinguishes us from brute beasts”. By thinking for ourselves, we are fulfilling our potential as humans by using our rationale. It is by questioning and thinking that we evolve as individuals, as a society, and as a species. Therefore, while humans have sometimes been taught not to think for themselves, the opposite is more natural.

Secondly, wilful ignorance is often used by individuals to avoid thinking for themselves about information that does not serve their purpose or makes them uncomfortable. Wilful ignorance – or professed ignorance – removes the guilt of avoiding thinking for yourself as it often appears to be true ignorance, which carries no responsibility. One example of this is how contemporary readers of Montaigne’s essay On the Cannibals were faced with his claim that the Tupinambá people were not the barbarians that Montaigne’s European readers believed them to be. Montaigne argues that the Europeans “surpass them [the Tupinambá people] in every kind of barbarianism”. This claim is uncomfortable for his contemporary readers just to accept, for as one critic (Bakewell) observes, Montaigne “[draws out the] contrast with France and the implications for European assumptions of superiority”. Montaigne’s reader is not only asked to reflect on the flaws of their own culture, but also to consider whether the European treatment of the indigenous people of Brazil is justified. Historians such as Patricia Seed argue that throughout the Western imperial efforts in the 15^th-17^th centuries, the barbarous nature – specifically the cannibalistic tendencies – of the native peoples in the colonies were used to justify both the imperialism and enslavement of them. As a result, the reader is forced to reconsider whether how the native people were treated by their fellow Frenchmen was moral as well as address any unconscious biases that they hold. This is a far more uncomfortable position than not reflecting on the truth of the claims regarding the Tupinambá people’s barbarity. To a modern audience, it seems shocking that Western society would tolerate ideas such as ethnic superiority, but the intolerance of a belief commonly held, demands personal sacrifice. A further example of active willful ignorance can be seen in the social context around Descartes’ writing. For example, the refusal of scholars such as Cremonini even to look through Galileo’s telescope in the eighteenth century, because it would affirm heliocentric claims that they did not support. Equally, the University of Utrecht attempted to silence Descartes because Descartes had challenged the authority of the old philosophy they taught. The unwillingness of intellectuals – whose professions it is- to think for themselves highlights how challenging the task can be.

Willful ignorance is also used to retain privileges that the individual holds while not thinking for themselves. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir points out that some women use willful ignorance to keep their status as the “other”, and “all the advantages an alliance with the superior caste” offers them. One example is economic advantages. Beauvoir also mentions the privilege of avoiding “the metaphysical risk” that comes with defining one’s own meaning and purpose, which can be daunting. It is far more comfortable to let someone else validate your existence. By retaining their position as the “other”, Beauvoir argues that women allow men to validate their existence and define their purpose. Descartes also recognizes a metaphysical risk, regarding his ‘Method of Doubt’, stating that “the doubt should not … be applied to ordinary life” because it could lead someone into existential meaninglessness. Edward Craig comments that he is “amazed” at Descartes’ positivity after so much doubt. It is far easier to remain passive by not taking responsibility by thinking for yourself. Willful ignorance clearly can be used to avoid uncomfortable truths to retain privilege, as well as avoiding any form of existentialism that comes when having to decide one’s own purpose.

Lastly, there is also a material risk that comes with separating yourself from the common beliefs and values of the community. This comes with speaking out about what conclusions you have come to by thinking for yourself. The material risk includes the possibility of losing your source of income, or social network. This risk is evident in Descartes’ hesitancy to publish the Discours, which was, according to the biographer Smith, on account of the “theologico-political context”, and for fear of condemnation such as that of Galileo in 1634. Furthermore, Descartes denies intending “to teach the method”, instead using the verb “to speak”, denying responsibility over the impact that it has on others. For Descartes, while he is still willing to think for himself, the risk of social rejection and religious condemnation prevented him from expressing those thoughts blatantly. Similarly, Montaigne was aware of the possible backlash that his opinions would bring and protects himself by making it a “private” matter for his “friends and kinsmen”. Both authors were clearly aware of the risk of alienation that comes with questioning the accepted ideas of society. However, Montaigne does show more willingness to criticise religious and cultural practices than Descartes. For example, he describes the actions of the Europeans excused by “duty and religion” as barbaric. He also makes observations about the “injustice” of the wealth divide, and the satirical jab at French prioritization of civility (“Ah! But they wear no breeches…”). Yet, Montaigne takes precautions, such as the latter example being a jest rather than an outspoken complaint. This is supported by the critic Marchi, who claims that Montaigne “refuses self-sacrifice” by avoiding “indubitable condemnation” of his culture. Montaigne is aware that writing a serious political statement would mean relinquishing things such as his social standing and instead writes a piece of work that he describes as “frivolous and vain”. Although the particulars of the threats that Descartes and Montaigne faced (such as ex-communication) no longer apply in the same way a thinker living in the twenty-first century, the threat exists in other forms. For example, the twenty-first century phenomenon of ‘cancel culture’ poses a significant challenge for any public figure wanting to think for themselves and question norms. For both sixteenth and seventeenth century writers, as well as modern thinkers, the risk of alienation or condemnation that comes with speaking out against the crowd makes it far easier for them to avoid thinking for themselves in the first place.

In conclusion, not thinking for yourself is often the more comfortable route, because of the many challenges that come with actively thinking, and the responsibility given to those who do think for themselves. It is more comfortable not to think for ourselves because what our culture believes and teaches us is familiar. Accepting these beliefs poses no challenge. Furthermore, the risk of speaking out about controversial thoughts or opinions often prevents individuals from thinking for themselves in the first place, as they are then able to feign (true) ignorance, and not take responsibility for any controversial claim that they find truth in. As soon as individuals do have thoughts that are contrary to that of society, a sense of obligation often drives them to speak on it or to take action. Not thinking for yourself is the only way to avoid this responsibility. The possibility that you might discover something that goes against what you previously believed is the overarching challenge and the primary reason that people avoid thinking for themselves.

Bibliography

Agostini, Igor, ‘Descartes’s Proofs of God and the Crisis of Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways in Early Modern Thomism: Scholastic and Cartesian Debates.’, The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 108, no. 2, (2015), pp. 235–62

Bakewell, Sarah, How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer, (London: Vintage, 2011)

Craig, Edward, ‘Some more high spots’, in Philosophy: a very short introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 74-80

De Beauvoir, Simone, The Second Sex, (London: Vintage Books, 2011)

De Montaigne, Michel, ‘On The Cannibals’, in The essays: a selection, ed. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 79-92

Descartes, René; Maclean, Ian, A Discours on the Method, (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008)

Descartes, René, ‘Part I. Of the Principles of Human Knowledge’, in Principles of Philosophy (United States: Dancing Unicorn Press, 2016)

Drake, Stillman, ‘Galileo and the Career of Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38. No. 1 (1977), pp. 19-32

Marchi, Dudley, ‘Montaigne and the New World: The Cannibalism of Cultural Production’, Modern Language Studies, Vo. 23, No. 4 (Y1993), pp. 35-54

Martel, H. E., ‘Hans Staden’s Captive Soul: Identity, Imperialism, and Rumors of Cannibalism in Sixteenth-Century Brazil’, Journal of World History, Vol. 17. No. 1 (2006), 51-69

Richman, Michèle. “The French Sociological Revolution from Montaigne to Mauss.” SubStance 31, no. 1 (2002) pp. 27–35

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Title, A Discourse on Inequality, (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 2010), ProQuest Ebook Central [Accessed November 29, 2023]

Seed, Patricia, American Pentimento: the Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001)

Smith, Steven, ‘An Exemplary Life: The Case of René Descartes’, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 57. No. 3 (2004), 571-597

In this essay, I will defend the ‘deterrence theory’ of punishment against its strongest objection, the ‘Kantian objection’, showing that the state is justified in punishing those who commit crimes. I use Erin Kelly’s adaption of deterrence theory, namely ‘sophisticated deterrence’ and support this by combining it with Jean Hampton’s ‘moral education theory’. Firstly, I will lay out deterrence theory, and the Kantian objection (that deterrence theory uses criminals as a means to an end). I will then give three arguments supporting Kelly’s defence theory, the latter argument supported by the moral education theory. These arguments are: (1) that the criteria for punishment in sophisticated deterrence ensures criminals are treated with dignity. (2) That sophisticated deterrence is grounded in the principle of self-defence, and (3) that the act of punishment in sophisticated deterrence can be justified by incorporating the moral education theory. Overall, I will conclude that with the support of the moral education theory, sophisticated deterrence provides a good justification for punishing criminals despite the Kantian objection.

Deterrence theory

Deterrence theory is a consequentialist justification for punishment, which argues that the main purpose of punishment is to prevent future evil. Punishment is justified because it incentivises would-be criminals to abide by the law, thus reducing future crime. The punishing of one criminal has a direct benefit to the wider community if it succeeds in dissuading other criminals from committing the same act. It contrasts retributive theories, which justify punishment as a response to a criminal’s immoral actions and for the sake of justice.

The Kantian objection to the deterrence theory

Deterrence theory is criticised for treating individuals as means to an end and using them as instruments for the greater good because of its consequentialist nature. This criticism is here labelled the Kantian objection because of its use of Kant’s Formula of Humanity. This states: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” The objection argues that punishing criminals in order to bring a benefit to the wider society, does not acknowledge the individuality and value of the person being punished, and instead uses them as a means to an end. This is because the criminal is an example to deter others from crime. One modern proponent of the Kantian argument is Hegel, who accuses deterrence theorists of not respecting human reason and inherent value and instead using punishment to train people to act according to society’s rules. According to Hegel, deterrence “treats a man like a dog instead of with the freedom and respect due to him as a man”. Overall, the Kantian objection claims that deterrence theorists do not recognise the individuality and value of the criminals who are punished.

Kelly’s sophisticated deterrence theory

Erin Kelly adapts the deterrence theory to a more sophisticated version that separates deterring an individual moral agent (named ‘specific deterrence’) from deterring the general public (‘general deterrence’). She states that the aim of the law is specific rather than general deterrence. In doing this, she shows that a threat of sanctions is personal to the individual, rather than using them as a means to deter others and through this benefit the wider community. She justifies carrying out the threat by arguing that the punishment is necessary in order for deterrence to be effective and that it then deters the criminal from reoffending. The following three arguments support Kelly’s response to the Kantian objection, with the latter bringing in the Moral Education theory to fully answer the objection.

Argument 1: The criteria for punishment in sophisticated deterrence ensures that the criminals are treated with dignity

Sophisticated deterrence holds certain criteria for punishment, two of which prioritise the dignified treatment of the criminals. These are the necessity that the criminals are rational and the principle of proportionality.

Kelly argues that punishment is only justified when the criminals are rational, which recognises their personhood and value. Kelly is clear in stating the necessity for those punished to be able to reason, so that the deincentivisation to re-offend is effective. One example is her statement that “the threat of punishment is properly directed only to those persons for whom it could rationally count as a disincentive under the circumstances”. The moral agents that Sophisticated Deterrence is aimed at are rational beings, able to reason with the knowledge of punishment and decide for themselves to offend/ re-offend or not. This shows that sophisticated deterrence does not aim to train people as one would train a dog, as Hegel accuses. Rather, Kelly states that the aim of the law is “to provide incentives to persons not otherwise sufficiently motivated to comply with the law's directives.”. Sophisticated deterrence does not view the criminals as tools to be used for a greater end, but as rational individuals. Furthermore, Kelly focuses on communication with the moral agents individually in specific deterrence through the threat or the punishment. The aim of the threats (to “provide incentives to persons”) means giving the moral agents rational reasons to comply with the law. Specific deterrence does not instrumentalise the criminals in order to communicate with the general public but communicates directly with the individuals as rational beings.

Secondly, Kelly’s criteria of proportional punishment for criminals shows respect for their inherent value and not just their value for deterrence. This can be seen in her extensive discussion of the importance of “establishing an upper limit to how much we may punish a given crime, even when further punishment would be efficacious for achieving greater deterrence.” The Kantian objection that utilitarian theories do not respect the individual rights and value of persons does not apply to sophisticated deterrence. Kelly’s note that further punishment might help her aim of deterrence is evidence of her priority to respect the individual’s rights. This matches most people’s intuitions about punishment, as demonstrated by Tullock in an example about illegal parking. He suggests an effective deterrence to illegal parking would be to boil all parking ticket recipients in oil. He also points out that, intuitively, most people would agree that this is wrong. Kelly recognises this intuition and has included the principle of proportionality in sophisticated deterrence, to recognise the rights and dignity of the individual criminal.

Argument 2: sophisticated deterrence is grounded in the principle of self-defence

Secondly, sophisticated deterrence is argued from the basis of self-defence which is commonly intuitively justified. This ensures that Kelly’s theory is grounded in a justified principle that does not treat people as a means to an end. Self-defence justifies the threat of punishment, rather than the punishment itself. By issuing a threat, the law is only causing harm to those who would commit crimes. This harm (which she calls the “costs” in the later quotation) is caused by issuing a threat of punishment and consists of the restriction of one’s liberty and the mental burden of the threat. Neither of these costs impacts those who do not wish to carry out the crimes. For example, the criminalisation of murder does not harm any citizen who does not wish to commit murder, as they would not feel threatened by the potential punishment. This harm is justified by the "burden-shifting principle of distributive justice that… permits us to impose costs on offenders in order to diffuse the threat they pose." This cost is justifiable if it helps to protect an otherwise victim because the redistribution of harm back to the aggressor (the “burden-shifting”) is an intuitively justified principle, in self-defence. When issued with a threat, the person who is harmed is not treated as instrumental or a means to an end because any cost that they face is in the protection of those that would be their victim. As a result, Kelly successfully defends that the issuing of a threat does not involve treating the criminal as a means to an end.

Argument 3: The act of punishment in sophisticated deterrence can be justified by incorporating the moral education theory

The use of punishment (as opposed to just the threat) in sophisticated deterrence can also be justified as not using people as a means to an end, when Kelly’s theory is adapted to incorporate an element of moral education. This puts more emphasis on the benefit to the individual rather than his effect on the deterrence of the public (general deterrence) or the individual’s deterrence from reoffending (Kelly’s special deterrence). Moral education theory is required, as Kelly’s argument for the punishment itself is a weaker justification than that for the threat of punishment against the Kantian objection.

To justify carrying out the punishment, Kelly argues that it aims to prevent the criminal from reoffending, and that it operates from the same principle of self-defence. She claims that “the aim of punishment is not to give criminal wrongdoers the suffering they deserve but, rather, to provide them with incentives to refrain from reoffending.” This differs from general deterrence, which punishes criminals in order for other people to be deterred. This does mean that the criminal is not being used simply as a means to an end regarding the deterrence of others, as the aim is to protect the specific criminal’s future victims. However, Kelly uses the same self-defence justification for the punishment as she does with the threat, despite the circumstances of these being different. This can be seen when she turns to “the same burden-shifting principle of distributive justice”. While issuing a threat does not cause harm to anyone but those who wish to commit the crime, punishing a criminal for crimes they committed previously does cause harm to them even if they have no intention to re-offend. In issuing a threat, any harm done is in the protection of a guaranteed victim, as someone not wanting to commit the crime would not be affected. However, there is no guarantee of a future victim when the criminal is being punished, and so the necessity of “burden-shifting” is not clear. Therefore, without also relying on the effect of general deterrence – which would treat the criminal as a means to an end - the punishment is not adequately justified as necessary.

A solution to this is to incorporate the moral education theory proposed by Jean Hampton. Like special deterrence, moral education does not justify punishment for the sake of society or social agendas and so does not use the suffering of the criminal as a means to this end. Instead, it focuses on the moral education of the criminal. Here, “punishment is justified as a way to prevent wrongdoing insofar as it can teach … wrongdoers … the moral reasons for choosing not to perform an offence.” Even if a criminal has no active intent to re-offend, he has not appreciated the extent of the moral objection to his actions, and so there is always a necessity for this effect, unlike the deterrence of re-offending that sophisticated deterrence alone aims for. Hampton states that “the moral education … does not sanction the use of a criminal for social purposes” and in this way, does not use the criminal instrumentally. By incorporating the aim of moral education into Kelly’s sophisticated deterrence, the act of punishment itself is also justified without treating the criminal purely as a means to an end.

In conclusion, Kelly’s sophisticated deterrence justifies state threats without treating people as a means, by focusing on individual deterrence rather than public deterrence, and her punishment criteria in place. When the second aim of moral education is also incorporated, punishment as a whole can be justified against the Kantian objection.

Bibliography

- Andenaes, Johannes. "THE MORALITY OF DETERRENCE." The University of Chicago Law Review 37, (1969): 649-664.

- Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

- Feuerbach, Paul Johann Anselm. Revision der Grundsätze und Grundbegriffe des positiven peinlichen Rechts. 48–58. (1799).

- Hampton, Jean. “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment.” In Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, edited by A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen, and Charles R. Beitz, 112–42. Princeton University Press, 1995.

- Hegel, G. W. F.. The Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Incorporated. 2002. ProQuest Ebook Central.

- Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by Herbert J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

- Kelly, Erin. “Rethinking Punishment.” In The Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility, 122–48. Harvard University Press, 2018.

- Kelly, Erin I. “Criminal Justice without Retribution.” The Journal of Philosophy 106, no. 8 (2009): 440–62.

- McHugh, James T. "Utilitarianism, Punishment, and Ideal Proportionality in Penal Law: Punishment as an Intrinsic Evil." Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 10 (2008):1-16.

- Nagin, Daniel S. “Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century.” Crime and Justice 42, no. 1 (2013): 199–263.

- Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Original Edition. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.

- Smart, J.J.C., and Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. - Tullock, Gordon. "Does Punishment Deter Crime?" The Public Interest, 1974. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1298113689/fulltextPDF/6BE61FFD1DAF4A36PQ/1?acc ountid=10792&sourcetype=Magazines.

Starter – Quick Bites

1) BigLaw goes all-in on GenAI. Latham & Watkins signed a firm-wide enterprise licence for Harvey, rolling out generative-AI tools to all lawyers and business professionals (announced 11 Aug).   

2) UK legal market: results season. TLT posted +7.5% revenue growth; Lewis Silkin reported strong revenue and profit gains; Fieldfisher’s PEP hit ~£1m; Clyde & Co’s revenue rose to £854m, underlining steady demand across disputes, regulatory and tech.

3) Markets watch. The FTSE 100 hovered near record territory during the week and is up ~10% YoY; macro focus remains on rate trajectories after the BoE’s early-month cut. (Use the FT’s live dashboard to track levels.)   

Main Course – Weekly Deep Dive

Enterprise AI hits the legal mainstream

On 11 August 2025, Latham & Watkins announced a firm-wide enterprise licence for Harvey (a GenAI platform for legal workflows), making Harvey available to all lawyers and business professionals across the firm. Stated use-cases include research, document analysis and drafting, with the firm signalling continued, material investment in GenAI capability.

Context:

• Over 2024–25, multiple global firms piloted or licensed GenAI tools; Latham has run internal AI Academy programmes and now joins peers formalising enterprise-scale deployments.

• Client demand is also moving: tech, finance and infrastructure clients increasingly expect law firms to deliver faster, tech-enabled outputs, while regulators (EU AI Act obligations for GPAI began applying from 2 Aug 2025) sharpen scrutiny around safe deployment.

Commercial implications?

Enterprise licensing means GenAI moves from “enthusiast lawyers” to standard tooling. The concequences:

• Productivity uplift in first-pass drafting, diligence triage and research

• Process re-design (e.g., knowledge-management pipelines feeding AI tools, new review protocols, updated client terms on AI usage)

• Talent expectations: trainees/associates will be expected to prompt, verify, and quality-assure AI outputs

• Competitive pressure: firms without credible AI programmes risk losing pitches on speed, cost-to-serve and data-security assurances. (See also broader industry coverage on the step-change to more advanced models.)

Why does it matter to you?

For law students who are interviewing, GenAI is an essential part of their commercial awareness. You should be ready to discuss use-cases, risks (confidentiality, hallucination, bias), and controls (human-in-the-loop, secure tenants, audit logs, client consent).

Side Dish – Tip of the Week

TIP: how to talk about a recent event in an interview.

Use the Latham x Harvey rollout as your case study. Structure a 90-second answer:

1. The move (this includes what happened, who was involved).

2. Client impact. What was the commercial impact? How does this benefit the client? (examples include faster turnaround; lower cost-to-serve; quality controls).

3. 3) Risks & safeguards (confidentiality, model limits, human review).

4. 4) Commercial takeaway (firms with credible AI stacks gain an edge in pitches).

5. Have one question ready. (For example, “How is the firm approaching secure data-isolation and auditability for GenAI tools?”).

Dessert: Names and Numbers

• Name: Miguel Zaldivar, CEO of Hogan Lovells, recently featured for his perspective on leadership and strategy in a changing legal market. He was interviewed in The Lawyer on 14 July 2025, in an in-depth conversation where he shared Hogan Lovells’ strategy, including plans to make New York their firm’s “fifth engine” of growth.

Sources

• Latham & Watkins: “Firmwide Deployment of Harvey” (11 Aug 2025) and related practice pages.

• The Lawyer – Latest News feed (11–12 Aug 2025): TLT, Lewis Silkin, Fieldfisher, Clyde & Co; Q2 2025 Litigation Tracker.

• City A.M.: Capital raising stats; LSEG valuation discussion.

• Financial Times: FTSE 100 live dashboard (level/1-yr change).

• The Economist: Weekly edition (16 Aug) and recent Britain/tech coverage for background reading.

• Latham & Watkins LinkedIn announcement (enterprise licence for Harvey).

• Miguel Zaldivar (Hogan Lovells) posts on leadership/features. (Note: LinkedIn content can be login-gated.)

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Welcome to Due Diligence! A comprehensive summary of this week’s legal and business updates to help you stay up-to-date with the commercial world.

Starter Course: Quick News Bites

1. Biggest UK Bioethanol Plant Faces Collapse
Vivergo Fuels, the UK's largest producer of bioethanol, is perilously close to shutting down unless it secures government support. The firm reports monthly losses of £3 million, mainly due to a recent UK–US trade agreement that removes tariffs on 1.4 billion liters of US ethanol - equivalent to the UK's entire annual demand - creating fierce, subsidised foreign competition.

2. Space Launch Breakthrough for UK Aerospace
Skyrora, a Scottish rocket company, made history this week by becoming the first UK-based firm to secure a space launch licence from the Civil Aviation Authority. This validates its plans to launch rockets from the new SaxaVord Spaceport in Shetland. If successful, it could mark the UK's return to domestic space launches and a leap forward for national space ambitions.

3. Abolition of “Shareholder Rule” Confirmed
The Privy Council delivered a landmark ruling in Jardine Strategic Holdings v Oasis Investments, affirming that the so-called “shareholder rule” does not apply in England & Wales. This is a legal principle that is used to apply in certain corporate disputes, especially in offshore jurisdictions like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and other Commonwealth countries. In simple terms, it allowed shareholders in a company to see privileged legal advice that the company had received in certain situations, usually when they were suing directors or other shareholders for wrongdoing on behalf of the company (what’s called a derivative action). This strengthens the confidentiality of legal advice in corporate disputes: a clear win for corporate legal privilege.

Main Course: Deep Dive

The Ransomware Paradox: To Pay or Not to Pay?

A recent survey by Commvault reveals a striking contradiction among UK business leaders when it comes to ransomware payments. On one hand, 96% support banning such payments across both public and private sectors. On the other hand, if forced to choose, an astonishing 75% admit they would still pay a ransom to save their business, even if doing so meant breaking the law.

Why the Conflict?

This tension arises from the heart of the ransomware dilemma: the legal principle versus business survival. Many UK firms feel trapped; torn between upholding ethical, legal standards and managing a crisis that can cripple operations. Sophos reports that the average total cost of ransomware recovery has shot up to $2.58 million, while 54% of UK firms said they would pay the ransom to retrieve their data, often paying more than the initial demand.

The situation becomes even more concerning when we consider that 31% of companies attacked once were assaulted again, and 41% of attackers didn’t deliver usable data even after the ransom was paid. Worse still, many victims learnt the hard way that paying doesn’t guarantee recovery.

Side Dish: Trend

Legal Tech and AI

Trend Snapshot
AI-driven legal technology is rapidly transforming the profession. UK law firms are increasingly adopting platforms that help them integrate AI. One such upcoming platform is ‘Juro’, which uses smart contracts to automate draughting, negotiation, and approvals, aiming to streamline workflows and minimise errors. Other tools focus on e-discovery, due diligence, and even litigation analytics, reshaping client expectations and lawyer productivity. Microsoft’s ‘copilot’ is widely used to help with everyday tasks.

Dessert: This Week in Names & Numbers

• Stat to Remember: 75%, the proportion of UK business leaders who admitted they would consider paying ransomware demands to save their companies—despite legal penalties.

• Name of the Week: The Rt Hon. the Baroness Butler-Sloss GBE.

  • Celebrated today for her 92nd birthday (born 10 August 1933). A trailblazer in British law, she was the first woman appointed as a Lord Justice of Appeal in 1988 and went on to become President of the Family Division of the High Court, remaining the highest-ranking female judge until 2004.

  • Today, she's a beloved figure in the House of Lords and a symbol of perseverance and equity—an inspirational figure for anyone entering law or public service.

📚 References

TechRadar Pro “UK businesses back a private-sector ransomware payment ban overwhelmingly” (2025, Aug 6)

ITPro “75% of UK business leaders are willing to risk criminal penalties to pay ransoms” (2025, Aug 6)

The Times “Shareholder rule no longer applicable in England and Wales” (2025, Aug 7)

The Times “Bioethanol plant closure risks UK economy and jobs” (2025, Aug 5)

Law Society of England and Wales “Key trends shaping the legal industry in 2025” (2025, Feb 4)

Legal Futures “The digital transformation of the UK legal profession in 2025” (2025, Jan 29)

Security Brief “UK firms face rising ransomware costs but recover faster” (2025, Aug 6)

ITPro “Nearly one-third of ransomware victims are hit multiple times” (2025, Aug 6)

First 100 Years “Baroness Butler-Sloss Biography”

Inner Temple Library “Elizabeth Butler-Sloss”